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Abstract
Collecting information has always been both a necessity and a challenge for the United Nations. 
The timely and accurate knowledge of relevant facts is undoubtedly a necessary prerequisite 
when exercising its functions. However, given the lack of autonomous sources of information, 
the United Nations is more often than not reliant upon States to acquire information before they 
take any action. Recent practice in this respect is marked by informality and opaqueness. These 
traits come into sharp focus particularly in the context of investigations led by United Nations. 
What this article will attempt to show is that flexibility, or at least good-functioning, does not 
necessarily imply informality. By taking similar examples of exchanges of information at the 
international, European and domestic levels, it will be argued that a formal legal basis stressing a 
limited number of conditions for the exchange of information has already been established and 
thus may be possible in the context of the United Nations. 
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1. Introduction
Collecting information has always been both a necessity and a challenge for 
the United Nations. The timely and accurate knowledge of relevant facts is 
undoubtedly a prerequisite to exercise its functions. However, given the lack 
of autonomous sources of information, the UN is more often than not reliant 
upon States to acquire information before they take any action. Recent 
practice in this respect is marked by informality and opaqueness. These traits 
are brought into sharp focus particularly in the context of investigations led 
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by United Nations. Once the United Nations is mandated to investigate a 
given event or situation, the first and necessary step is indeed to collaborate 
with those who have the relevant information, which is generally States. 
Frequently, the United Nations actually requests information from the 
administrations of States. However, as these exchanges of information 
have generally taken the form of informal channels, the procedure is rarely 
transparent. In isolated cases, the collaborating State makes its collaboration 
public, but these are the exception rather than the rule. This occurred, 
for example, when Switzerland did so in the context of inquiries on the 
Oil-for-Food Programme. In order to investigate allegations of fraud and 
corruption on the part of United Nations officials, personnel, and agents, 
as well as contractors in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed, in April 2004, an 
Independent Inquiry Committee (hereinafter the Volcker Commission) 
specially devoted to this matter.1 Following this, the United Nations Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1538 (2004), which endorsed the 
inquiry and called for full cooperation in the investigation by all United 
Nations officials and personnel, the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, 
and all other Member States, including their national regulatory authori-
ties. Immediately as its mission began, the Volcker Commission requested 
assistance from a number of States, among them Switzerland and its State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), and the Swiss Federal Council 
authorised SECO to cooperate with the Volcker Commission on 22 
December 2004.2 Subsequently, approximately 170 federal files including 
numerous banking documents were communicated by the Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission (CFB) to the Volcker Commission, and interviews 
with 30 different representatives of banks and merchants in oil and other 
enterprises took place in Switzerland under the supervision of SECO.3
1) The Committee was chaired by Paul A. Volcker, former Chairman of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the United States Federal Reserve. The other members were Richard J. Goldstone, 
Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa from 1994 to 2003 and Visiting Professor 
of Law at Harvard Law School, and Mark Pieth, Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology 
at the University of Basel. See <www.iic-offp.org/members.htm>.
2) Three requests for assistance were made by the IIC. The first was made on 21 October 
2004, while the second and third were made on 22 November 2004. See <www.seco.admin.
ch/aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=fr&msg-id=9500>.
3) See <www.seco.admin.ch/aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=fr&msg-id=9635>.
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This case raises many questions. What is the legal basis for this coopera-
tion? Is there an obligation for the State to furnish the requested documents? 
What are the consequences of a State refusing such a request? Under what 
conditions does the exchange of information have to be made? What happens 
when the United Nations itself is requested to give information they obtained 
from one State to another State? It is noteworthy that in the same context 
of the investigations on the Oil-for-Food Programme, at least six Congres-
sional panels, the Treasury Department, the United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York, and the Manhattan District Attorney, were 
also investigating allegations of corruption and mismanagement.4 During a 
meeting organized in Washington on 13 July 2004, officials and diplomats 
representing the United States stated that Paul A. Volcker had rejected requests 
from members of Congress for access to review documents and to interview 
United Nations officials being scrutinized by the Volker Commission.5 
Although this practice of cooperation is a recurring reality for the United 
Nations, and can be a crucial means to fulfil its functions, its legal framework 
remains unclear and controversial. The exchange of information in this 
way relies more on political arrangements between the United Nations 
and the States concerned than on legal obligation. For practical reasons, 
the determination of applicable rules may not be a priority for the United 
Nations and States, as long as no particular problems arise, and as long as 
exchanges of information can take place through informal and political 
processes. However, it is likewise true that the lack of a clear legal framework 
could hamper the requesting authority in fulfilling its objectives when the 
institution giving the information is reluctant to furnish confidential or 
sensitive documents in the absence of legal guarantees. 
Regardless, acting outside of any formal legal framework does not bode 
well for the United Nations as it strives for transparency and legitimacy.6 
One can argue that the type of relationship described above necessarily 
implies a degree of flexibility, and thus of informality. What this article 
will attempt to show is that flexibility, or at least good-functioning, does 
4) See Judith Miller, “U.N. and Congress in Dispute over Iraq Oil-for-Food Inquiries”, The 
New York Times, 28 July 2004.
5) Ibid.
6) See, e.g., Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Mainstreaming International Law within 
the United Nations”, 1 International Organizations Law Review (2007), pp.165–168.
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not necessarily imply informality. Taking similar examples of exchanges of 
information at the international, European, and domestic levels, it will be 
argued that a formal legal basis stressing a limited number of conditions 
for the exchange of information has already been established and thus may 
be possible in the context of the United Nations. 
The structure of this article is as follows. First, it will define in more 
detail the collaboration between the United Nations and States (Section 
2). Secondly, the question of the legal basis of the exchange of information 
between the United Nations and States will be addressed (3). Next, the 
exchange of information at the international level also takes place between 
entities other than international organizations and States. The study of these 
relationships may indicate possible ways to strengthen the legal framework 
for the aforementioned exchanges (4). Furthermore, the European (5), 
and the domestic levels (6), may also provide enlightening insights into 
the matter. Lastly, we will suggest some conditions gathered that, in the 
author’s view, should be applied to the exchange of information between 
international organizations and States (7).
2. terminological Remarks 
The collaboration between States and the United Nations can take many 
forms. The particular form that will be studied in this paper is the exchange 
of information. The latter occurs when one of the United Nations bodies 
requests information from a State in order to fulfil one of the objectives of 
the requesting authority. The term information is broadly understood here. 
It can cover, for example, the exchange of banking or fiscal documents, 
access to databases, or interviewing witnesses. As already mentioned, United 
Nations activities that give rise to this type of collaboration usually occurs 
during the course of investigations.
The notion of an ‘investigation’ has been defined as covering “any activity 
designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute 
or situation which the competent United Nations organs need in order to 
exercise effectively their functions in relation to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security”.7 The sole provision of the UN Charter that 
7) General Assembly, Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, A/RES/46/59, 9 December 1991, para. 2, 
<www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r059.htm>.
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assigns investigatory powers to a United Nations organ is Article 34. This 
empowers the Security Council to investigate “any dispute, or any situation 
which might lead to international friction or give rise to dispute, in order to 
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”. However, 
the Security Council is not the only organ of the United Nations that is 
authorized to make investigations. According to the implied powers theory, 
other UN organs, such as the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, 
can conduct investigations.8 Similarly, the Security Council is empowered 
to acquire information by other means of investigations and for purposes 
other than those mentioned in Article 34.9 
In practice, only two decisions of the Security Council in which it ordered 
an investigation referring expressly to Article 34 have been taken.10 More 
frequently, the Security Council has decided to investigate outside of the 
framework of Article 34, using its implied powers as a mandate to do so.11 
Recent practice has confirmed the tendency of the Security Council to 
collect information by more informal means to avoid the restrictive scope 
of Article 34. Using Article 28 of its Provisional Rules of Procedure, the 
Security Council has established specific bodies to conduct investigations.12 
These bodies have had different names over time, such as “sub-committee”,13 
“special mission”,14 or “commission of investigation”.15 In these cases, it 
was foreseen that the investigatory organs should benefit from the full 
cooperation of States. In the Corfu Channel case, for example, the Security 
Council “empowered the sub-committee to request further information as it 
deem[ed] necessary from the parties to the dispute, and the representatives 
8) Theodor Schweisfurth, “Article 34”, in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995), p. 515.
9) Ibid.
10) In 1946 and 1948 in the Greek Frontier Incidents Questions case and the India-Pakistan 
Question case respectively.
11) In the Corfu Channel Incidents case in 1947, for example.
12) “The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a 
specified question.” 
13) Security Council Resolution 19, S/RES/19, 13 February 1947. 
14) Security Council Resolution 289, S/RES/289, 23 November 1970.
15) Security Council Resolution 571, S/RES/571, 20 September 1985. 
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of the United Kingdom and Albania [were] requested to give every assistance 
to the sub-committee in its work”.16 In situations requiring urgent action, 
the Security Council has also requested the Secretary General to appoint 
a mission of investigation in accordance with the powers of that office.17 
This shows a clear tendency on the part of the Security Council to delegate 
its investigative powers.18 
These practices have prompted the need to redefine the notion of 
investigation in the context of the United Nations. Regarding the definition 
adopted in Article 34, the purpose of the investigation – the maintenance 
of international peace and security – seems to be the primary criterion. 
This real purpose of Article 34 was presumably one of the reasons that the 
Security Council has avoided reference to it as a mandate for investigations 
in recent times.19 Instead of a strict focus on the originally intended end 
of the provision, however, it may be more appropriate to shift attention to 
the means of investigation used by the United Nations (that is, the actual 
exchange of information). Investigation in the United Nations today implies 
the use by the Security Council, or another organ of the United Nations, of 
a fact-finding procedure – through an exchange of information – mandated 
by their implied powers of investigation. Consequently, it is this aspect of 
procedure that will form the centrepiece of the present study. 
3. Legal Basis for the exchange of Information between the Un and states
Even if the implied powers theory can justify the right of UN organs to 
investigate, it nevertheless leaves another important question unanswered: 
do States have an obligation to respond positively to the request for infor-
mation? In this section, the potential legal sources of this obligation will 
be studied methodically, starting with a State’s membership in the United 
Nations (Section 3.1), followed by Chapter VII of the UN Charter (3.2), 
and then other relevant dispositions of the UN Charter, such as Article 25 
(3.3), will be considered. Lastly, this study will analyze the questions raised 
16) Supra note 13.
17) Security Council Resolution 780, S/RES/780, 6 October 1992 or, more recently, Security 
Council Resolution 1564, S/RES/1564, 18 September 2004. 
18) Sofiène Bouiffror, “Article 34”, in Jean-Pierre Cot et al. (eds.), La Charte des Nations 
Unies: Commentaire article par article (Economica, Paris, 3rd edition, 2005), p. 1070.
19) Schweisfurth, supra note 8, p. 518.
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by the delegation of investigation powers from the Security Council to the 
Secretary-General (3.4).
3.1. An Obligation to Cooperate Stemming From Membership?
The first argument for the existence of an obligation to cooperate on the 
international plane may originate simply by virtue of being a member of 
an organization. In this respect, both the State and the organization will 
inherently have an obligation to cooperate with one another given that each 
has freely entered into a reciprocal relationship of sorts. This argument was 
explicitly used by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion 
on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO 
and Egypt. According to the Court, “the very fact of Egypt’s membership 
of the Organization entails certain mutual obligations of cooperation and 
good faith incumbent upon Egypt and upon the Organization”.20 The 
Court clearly states here that a duty to cooperate applies not only between 
the international organization and the host State, but also in respect of all 
Member States.21 
An obligation to cooperate may be strengthened by the existence of good 
faith in a given relationship. Good faith can operate not only to ensure that 
the activities of international organizations are conducted effectively, but 
it can also help to prompt cooperation by ensuring that all means available 
to cooperate are used.22 Logically, it may be said that a member of a given 
international organization who voluntarily refuses to cooperate where it has 
20) Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 20 December 
1980, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1980, p.93, para. 43. As 
Roberto Ago pointed out in his separate opinion: “Paragraph 43 of the Advisory Opinion 
very properly emphasizes that the legal relations between an international organization and 
the host State constitute a special régime. The paragraphs which follow it treat at length 
of the obligations to consult, negotiate and cooperate which this special régime implies, 
defining them in correct though cautious terms. At the same time they draw attention to 
the solid foundation for these obligations which already exists in the principles of general 
international law concerning the subject of international organizations, as well as what may 
be called the common principles emerging from the whole body of conventional instruments 
concluded between States and international organizations”. Separate Opinion of Judge Ago, 
ICJ Reports 1980, p. 158. 
21) In this respect, see Charles A. Wintermeyer, “ICJ Advisory Opinion: 1951 WHO-Egypt 
Treaty”, 10 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy (1980–1981), p. 565.
22) See infra, Section 7.3.
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the ability to do so, is not acting in good faith. This link between the obliga-
tion to cooperate and an obligation of good faith was also highlighted by 
the Commission on Darfur when it considered that “both the Government 
of Sudan and the rebels (were) under a bona fide obligation to cooperate 
with it in the discharge of its various functions”.23 
Is this sufficient to conclude with certainty that such an obligation 
exists? At this juncture, it is necessary to distinguish the two sides of the 
aforementioned obligation, which are an obligation to cooperate and an 
obligation to do so in good faith. These obligations are manifestly inter-
dependent. However, the existence of an independent obligation to act in 
good faith in this context is open to doubt. Indeed, there is probably only 
an obligation to abide by already existing substantial rules in good faith.24 
This interpretation has been adopted by the Court itself eight years after 
the WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion.25 The weakness of any obligation to 
act in good faith may be thus derived from the uncertainties concerning 
the normative status of the obligation to cooperate. This is fundamentally 
problematic for the abovementioned argument.
All considered, the existence of an obligation to cooperate which stems 
from membership in an international organization is doubtful, or at least, 
controversial. In any case, if we admit that a customary rule is emerging, its 
operational features remain unclear and many questions are left unanswered. 
What is the concrete meaning of this obligation? Does the obligation apply 
to ultra vires activities of international organizations? Furthermore, the 
existence of such an obligation must be analyzed by taking into account the 
specific character of membership. While sovereign States submit themselves 
voluntarily to international organizations by becoming members, they 
nevertheless retain control over both themselves and their institutions.26 
23) Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General, S/2005/60, p. 14, para. 27, <www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf>.
24) Jean Combacau, “La question du transfert du bureau régional de l’OMS devant la Cour 
internationale de Justice (Avis consultatif du 20 décembre 1980)”, Annuaire français de droit 
international (1980), pp. 243–244.
25) “The principle of good faith is … not in itself a source of obligation where none would 
otherwise exist.” Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 20 December 
1988, International Court of Justice, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 1988, p. 105, 
para. 94.
26) Daniel Vignes, “La participation aux organisations internationals”, in René-Jean Dupuy 
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Where the UN faces a situation in which a State refuses to cooperate, it 
may have to resort to a more coercive measure to extract information. One 
option is for it to premise its request on a less controversial and more solid 
foundation, such as its mandatory Chapter VII powers.
3.2. An Obligation to Cooperate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter?
Regarding fact-finding committees, cooperation has been premised on 
Chapter VII in two occasions: when States were requested to cooperate with 
the Commission on Darfur, and also when the commission was established 
to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri. The legal basis for the Commission on Darfur was Article 41 of 
the UN Charter, used here for the first time to authorize the creation of a 
fact-finding committee.27 In its Report, released on 25 January 2005, the 
Commission noted that both the Government of Sudan and the rebel 
groups had willingly accepted to cooperate with the Commission, notably 
by providing it with free access to all sources of information, including 
documentary material and physical evidence.28
Originally, the Commission on the assassination of former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was not based on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.29 On 13 June 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding, which 
(ed.), Manuel sur les organisations internationales (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 
1998), p. 61.
27) Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004). The SC, “Determining that the situation in 
Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”, (para. 12) “Requests that the 
Secretary-General rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order im-
mediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have 
occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that 
those responsible are held accountable, calls on all parties to cooperate fully with such a 
commission, and further requests the Secretary-General, in conjunction with the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to take appropriate steps to increase the number 
of human rights monitors deployed to Darfur”.
28) Supra note 23.
29) Security Council Resolution 1595, S/RES/1595, 7 April 2005, para 3. The SC “decides 
that, to ensure the Commission’s effectiveness in the discharge of its duties, the Commission 
shall … Enjoy the full cooperation of the Lebanese authorities, including full access to all 
documentary, testimonial and physical information and evidence in their possession that the 
Commission deems relevant to the inquiry [and] Have the authority to collect any additional 
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defined the modalities of the cooperation, was signed by the Commission 
and the Lebanese Government respectively.30 In this agreement it was 
decided that the Lebanese Government, 
shall guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the conduct of 
its investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to fulfil its mandate, 
including … [p]rovision of all documentary, testimonial and physical information and 
evidence in possession of the Lebanese authorities on the case as soon as possible, but no 
later than three days after the signature of this MOU. Any additional documentary, 
testimonial or physical information and evidence that may be collected by the Lebanese 
authorities after the signature of this MOU, shall also be provided to the Commission 
as soon as possible, but no later than three days from the date they were collected.31
In the first report released on 20 October 2005, the Commission emphasised 
the lack of cooperation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, 
which had impeded the investigation.32 Following this report, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1636, which was based on its Chapter VII 
powers, resolving that all States shall cooperate with the Commission.33 
information and evidence, both documentary and physical, pertaining to this terrorist act, as 
well as to interview all officials and other persons in Lebanon, that the Commission deems 
relevant to the inquiry”. However, in the meantime, the SC at para. 7 “Calls on all States 
and all parties to cooperate fully with the Commission, and in particular to provide it with 




32) First Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 1595, S/2005/662, 20 October 2005, p. 19, <www.securitycoun-
cilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20
S2005662.pdf>.
33) Security Council Resolution 1636, S/RES/1636. The SC, “Acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations”, (para. 3) “Decides as a step to assist in the investigation 
of this crime and without prejudice to the ultimate judicial determination of the guilt or 
innocence of any individual; (a) that all individuals designated by the Commission or the 
Government of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organizing 
or perpetrating of this terrorist act, upon notification of such designation to and agreement 
of the Committee established in subparagraph (b) below, shall be subject to the following 
measures: … All States shall: cooperate fully in accordance with applicable law with any 
international investigations related to the assets or financial transactions of such individuals, 
entities or persons acting on their behalf, including through sharing of financial information”.
  415Fromageau / International Organizations Law Review 7 (2010) 405–439
This Resolution was especially adopted to enhance the collaboration of Syria 
with the inquiry, which was accused of not cooperating or even trying to 
undermine the work of the Commission. It was noted in the second report, 
released after Resolution 1636, that the Commission’s efforts to gain the 
cooperation of the Syrian authorities “have recently begun to bear fruit 
after delays which had an impact on the Commission’s ability to effectively 
carry out its work”.34
In short, it seems that the use of Chapter VII powers by the Security 
Council is a means to induce the cooperation of States. As the General 
Assembly Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field 
of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security provides: “States 
should cooperate with United Nations fact-finding missions and give them, 
within the limits of their capabilities, the full and prompt assistance necessary 
for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their mandate”.35 
It must be noted here that the use of Chapter VII of the Charter should 
not be interpreted as requiring States to cooperate, but only as a way of 
enhancing their cooperation. In the end, the final decision to cooperate or 
not will be made by States. In the absence of their cooperation, committees 
will not risk a direct confrontation with the uncooperative State. They will 
simply refer the matter to the Security Council when a State does not agree 
to furnish documents. Where the State still fails to take heed, their refusal 
to act in accordance with its obligations will be noted.36
Finally, it appears that Chapter VII, albeit useful to induce States to 
cooperate, cannot be the panacea in every case. It can serve as a legal basis, 
but only in certain limited cases. In this way, investigations are often required 
for situations other than those that qualify as a threat to the peace, breaches 
34) Letter dated 12 December 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, S/2005/775, 12 December 2005, p. 1. See <www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2005775.pdf>.
35) General Assembly, Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, supra note 7, para. 22.
36) Before the Darfur and Lebanon Committees, the Security Council has called States to 
cooperate with Committees, but it was not based on Chapter VII at that time. For example, 
in its Resolution 1053 (1996), S/RES/1053, the Security Council (para. 8) “expresses concern 
at the lack of response by certain States to the Commission’s inquiries, and calls upon those 
States that have not yet done so to cooperate fully with the Commission in its inquiries and 
to investigate fully reports of their officials and nationals suspected of violating the relevant 
Council resolutions”.
416 Fromageau / International Organizations Law Review 7 (2010) 405–439
of the peace, or as an act of aggression, which is the criterion for decisions 
taken under Chapter VII. This would be the case, for example, in respect 
of investigations concerning frauds committed by United Nations or State 
agents. 
3.3. An Obligation to Cooperate under Other Provisions of the UN Charter?
Other provisions of the UN Charter may be a source of an obligation 
for States to assist international organizations in their investigations. A 
cursory examination of Article 2(5) suggests that this provision contains a 
general obligation for Member States to give assistance to the organization.37 
However, as the obligation under this provision applies to “actions” and 
the last part of the sentence in the provision refers to “enforcement action”, 
it is clear that “only enforcement measures taken by the Security Council 
according to Chapter VII can be envisaged”.38 
Another argument may be that States have an obligation to assist the 
United Nations each time the Security Council makes a request to that effect, 
by virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter.39 According to this reasoning, 
Article 25 could be a means to oblige States to give assistance when the 
Security Council so decides, even if its decision in this respect is not based 
on Chapter VII. This obligation to “accept and carry out” the decision to 
investigate could also be interpreted as giving a binding effect to the request 
based on Article 34 of the UN Charter.40 According to the International 
Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, before determining 
if a resolution of the Security Council has binding force, “the language used 
by the Security Council should be carefully analysed”.41 The importance of 
37) Article 2(5) of the UN Charter: “All Members shall give the United Nations every 
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain 
from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive 
or enforcement action”.
38) Jochen A. Frowein, “Article 2(5)”, in Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Com-
mentary, supra note 8, pp. 129–131.
39) Article 25 of the UN Charter: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”.
40) Schweisfurth, supra note 8, p. 525. 
41) Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 21 June 1971, International 
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 53, para. 114.
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the language used by the Security Council may be seen, for example, when 
it ‘decides’ to request the implementation of economic sanctions, rather 
than simply to emphasise the political will of the Council. This tends to 
occur where it is attempting to strengthen the legal obligation at stake.42 In 
contrast, the Security Council may hesitate to phrase an obligation in terms 
of a ‘decision’, when it feels that this obligation will not be implemented 
immediately or when it believes it is more important to highlight its political 
will rather than the legal obligation to the addressee of the resolution.43 In 
practice, it appears that the Security Council tends rather to ‘call upon’ States 
to cooperate fully than to ‘decide’ that States must cooperate. 
Chapter VII and Article 25 of the UN Charter can sometimes provide 
a legal basis at the international level, but not one that is permanent and 
that will work in every case. An obligation probably to cooperate when the 
Security Council decides that a State has to cooperate, or when its request 
is based on Chapter VII. However, this becomes problematic in the case of 
investigations led by other organs of the United Nations. These investiga-
tions have become more relevant given the recent tendency of the Security 
Council to delegate investigation powers to the Secretary-General. 
3.4. Questions Raised by the Appointment of Inquiry Committees by the 
Secretary-General in the Absence of Further Endorsement by the Security 
Council
Three recent appointments of Inquiry Committees by the UN Secretary-
General have raised interesting questions concerning the obligation to 
cooperate with the United Nations. These are, namely: the United Nations 
Headquarters Board of Inquiry into certain incidents in the Gaza Strip 
between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009, established on February 
2009;44 the Commission on the assassination of the former Prime Minister 
of Pakistan Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on July 2009;45 and the Guinea 
42) Eric Suy and Nicolas Angelet, “Article 25”, in Cot et al., supra note 19, p. 915.
43) Ibid.
44) Letter dated 4 May 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, A/63/855-S/2009/250, 15 May 2009, see <www.daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N09/338/94/PDF/N0933894.pdf?OpenElement>.
45) See the statement of the Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon issued on 
19 June 2009, “Three-Person Commission of Inquiry into Assassination of Former Pakistani 
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Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Events of 28 September on October 
2009.46 These three commissions were presumably created on the basis of 
Article 7(2) of the UN Charter, and therefore have the status of subsidiary 
organs of the Secretariat. This procedure is not new. It had previously 
been used to establish, for example, the Volcker Commission in April 
2004. However, the inquiry in the case of the Volcker Commission was 
subsequently endorsed by the Security Council, partly resolving questions 
regarding the force of the obligation to cooperate incumbent upon States. 
The inquiries on incidents in the Gaza Strip between 27 December 2008 and 
19 January 2009, on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and on the events 
of 28 September in Guinea are not, at least at the present time, endorsed 
by the Security Council. It would be controversial, therefore, to identify an 
obligation for a State to furnish information in these cases. Given that the 
United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry was established in a specific 
context and for a different purpose, that is to investigate the damages suffered 
by United Nations personnel and buildings, it will be examined separately 
from the two other examples to be presently considered. 
The Commission on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the Com-
mission of Inquiry for Guinea were established following requests addressed 
respectively by Pakistan and Guinea to the UN Secretary-General. According 
to the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council concerning the Commission on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, 
[t]he international commission would enjoy the full cooperation of the Pakistani 
authorities and be accorded the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the 
independent conduct of the inquiry including, in particular, unhindered access to all 
relevant sources of information. The International Commission may request coopera-
tion of a third State in the collection of materials or information relevant to the case. 
I count on the full cooperation of Member States with such request.47 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to Begin Six-Month Mandate 1 July 2009”, <www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12328.doc.htm>.
46) See the statement of the Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon issued 
on 30 October 2009, “Secretary-General Announces Members of Guinea Commission 
of Inquiry to Investigate Events of 28 September”, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/
sgsm12581.doc.htm>.
47) Letter dated 2 February 2009 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council, S/2009/67, 3 February 2009, <www.daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N09/226/66/PDF/N0922666.pdf?OpenElement>.
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The terms of reference of the Commission were annexed to the letter. Its 
Article 2 states that “the Commission shall enjoy the full cooperation of the 
Government of Pakistan”, whereas Article 3 foresees requests for cooperation 
by third States.48 The terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry for 
Guinea contain mutatis mutandis similar provisions, respectively in Articles 
3 and 4.49 The ‘softness’ of these recent practices may be explained by the 
fact that the establishment of each commission was expressly requested by 
the State concerned. The government of Guinea has, moreover, indicated 
in writing its willingness to cooperate with and facilitate the work of the 
Commission.50 
The Commission on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto has recently 
encountered the limits of its cooperation with Pakistani authorities as its 
written request to interrogate military officials, including the Chief of 
Army Staff Ashaq Parvez Kayani, former ISI Chief Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj 
and former Military Intelligence Chief Lt. Gen. Naddem Ejaz Mian, was 
rejected by the Government of Pakistan.51 Following the extension of its 
mandate by three more months, the Commission released its report on 15 
April 2010.52 This report revealed not only a lack of cooperation but also 
“efforts of certain high-ranking government officials to obstruct access to 
Pakistani military and intelligence sources”.53
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Guinea was released on 18 
December 2009.54 It has been noted that 
48) Ibid.
49) Letter dated 28 October 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, S/2009/556, 28 October 2009, <www.daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N09/581/27/PDF/N0958127.pdf?OpenElement>.
50) Ibid.
51) See “Limited Mandate Hinders UN Probe into Bhutto’s Killing”, 31 Decem-
ber 2009, <www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/
pakistan/18-limited-mandate-hinders-un-probe-into-bhuttos-killing-am-03>.
52) See “La commission d’enquête sur l’assassinat de Bhutto a achevé sa dernière visite”, 26 
February 2010, <www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=21328&Cr=bhutto&Cr1=>.
53) Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the Facts and Circumstances of the 
Assassination of Former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, 15 April 2010, p. 
4, para. 6, <www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Pakistan/UN_Bhutto_Report_15April2010.pdf>. 
54) Letter dated 18 December 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the 
Secretary-General, S/2009/693, 18 December 2009, <www.daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N09/662/59/PDF/N0966259.pdf?OpenElement>.
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all of the Commission’s meetings with the authorities proceeded smoothly and with 
full cooperation of the authorities, except for a number of requests that were denied 
or ignored. Lieutenant Toumba, for example, denied the Commission’s request 
to meet with individuals under his command who had been identified as such or 
who were alleged to have actively participated in the events of 28 September at 
the Stadium. The Minister of Defence did not reply to the Commission’s request 
to visit the Kundara and Kassa camps and, despite several oral requests to the 
Director-General of the National Police, a copy of the report prepared by the 
technical and scientific police experts present at the stadium and at the Bellevue 
police station was never provided.55
The United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry was established to 
investigate a number of incidents which occurred during the course 
of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel in which United 
Nations personnel, premises and operations were affected. Its context 
and purpose are clearly different from the two other examples already 
mentioned. Regarding the Pakistan and Guinea requests, the inquiry 
committees were acting, following what was in effect a, ‘delegation of 
competence’ given by the requesting State. Committees give technical 
support but also, above all, provide a guarantee of independence and 
legitimacy to the inquiry. This is significant given that the investigations 
concern events in which current or former governmental authorities were 
or were supposed to be involved. 
It must be noted that the report made public by the Board was not 
the full report but rather a summary. It is noteworthy that a high level of 
confidentiality has been adopted during this inquiry. Indeed, the Secretary-
General noted that “the Board’s report is an internal document and is not 
for public release. It contains significant amounts of information that was 
shared with the Board in strict confidence. It also contains a significant 
body of information, the disclosure of which could prejudice the security 
or proper conduct of the Organization’s operations or activities”.56 Such 
confidentiality may well have enhanced the cooperation of Israel and may 
55) Report of the International Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and 
Circumstances of the Events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, annexed to the Letter dated 18 
December 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General, 
S/2009/693, 18 December 2009, pp. 8–9, para. 20.
56) Letter dated 4 May 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, S/2009/250, 15 May 2009.
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explain why no explicit reference was made in the summary of any lack 
of cooperation by Israel. Latter parts of this study will be devoted to the 
potential of strengthening confidentiality in all exchanges of information.57 
However, we must remain aware of the fact that given the internal nature 
of the inquiry, to make public a lack of cooperation on the part of Israel 
would have been of limited utility. 
Overall, it appears that the exchange of information between the 
United Nations and States can function without any problems. However, 
the proper functioning of those exchanges relies more on diplomatic 
arrangements than on legal guarantees. The consequences of a refusal to 
cooperate with a Committee are thus outside of its realm of control. If an 
obligation to cooperate could be identified in some cases, (that is within 
the framework of Chapter VII powers), uncertainties still remain about 
the enforcement of this obligation. Is it really plausible, for example, that 
a State’s refusal to respond to a request for information be qualified as a 
threat to the peace?58 
It seems necessary to formalize these relationships. It should be taken into 
account, of course, that these exchanges are of a specific nature and inevitably 
encroach upon a State’s sovereignty. The establishment of an obligation in 
this domain could therefore be challenging. Nevertheless, the study of other 
types of exchanges of information at the international level may be useful 
to identify possible means and the methodology to meet this challenge. 
4. Lessons that Can be Learned from Other Information sharing 
Channels at the International Level
There are other mechanisms which allow for the exchange of information 
at the international level. The study of these mechanisms may help in 
identifying how the relationships between the UN and States can be 
formalized. The present study will now turn to examine both the exchange 
of information in the context of criminal procedures (Section 4.1), and also 
between international organizations (4.2).
57) See infra Section 7.
58) In this respect, see Ernest L. Kerley, “The Powers of Investigation of the United Nations 
Security Council”, 55 American Journal of International Law (1961), p. 903.
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4.1. Exchange of Information in the Context of Criminal Procedures
The exchange of information in the context of criminal procedure cov-
ers all proceedings for international cooperation in the enforcement of 
criminal law.59 This form of cooperation has the advantage of permitting 
implementation of important coercive measures and of providing more 
elaborate means of inquiry. It includes inter alia, extradition, the transfer 
of criminal proceedings, and execution of foreign criminal judgments.60 
Cooperation in criminal matters at the international level is formalized first 
in bilateral treaties concluded between States. In order to increase this type 
of cooperation, a model treaty on mutual criminal assistance was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 45/117 (1990).61 In 
this Resolution, the General Assembly explicitly recognized “the importance 
of a model treaty … as an effective way of dealing with the complex 
aspects and serious consequences of crime, especially in its new forms and 
dimensions”.62 Some time before this initiative, the European Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, adopted on 20 April 1959 by 
the Council of Europe, was in place to enhance criminal cooperation in a 
multilateral way within Europe.63 
Cooperation in criminal matters also takes place between States and 
international courts and tribunals. According to Articles 29 and 28 of 
their respective Statutes, all Member States of the United Nations have an 
obligation to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
59) Beat Frey, International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: Guideline, Federal Office 
for Police Matters – Section for International Mutual Assistance (Bern, 1998), p. 3. 
60) Ibid.




63) European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, <www.conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/030.htm>.
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former Yugoslavia64 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.65 
Under Articles 86 to 102 of the Statute of Rome establishing the International 
Criminal Court, States Parties have an obligation to furnish assistance to 
the Court as well. However, the regime of those obligations will not be the 
same, since the obligation to cooperate with ICTY and ICTR is provided 
by Security Council resolutions, whereas the obligation to cooperate with 
the ICC is treaty-based. Only States that are parties to the Statute will in 
principle be under an international obligation to cooperate with the Court,66 
whereas with the ad hoc Tribunals established on the basis of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, all Member States of the UN are under an obligation 
to cooperate with the Tribunals.67 
We can also note that both the ICTY68 and ICC69 can collaborate with 
States when they are leading investigations or trials for crimes which fall 
their respective jurisdictions. Agreements allowing for the exchange of 
64) Article 29 of the Statute of ICTY provides: “1. States shall co-operate with the Inter-
national Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 2. States shall comply without undue 
delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but 
not limited to: (a) the identification and location of persons; (b) the taking of testimony 
and the production of evidence; (c) the service of documents; (d) the arrest or detention 
of persons; (e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal”, 
<www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept08_en.pdf>.
65) Article 28 of the Statute of ICTR, which is formulated mutatis mutandis identically as 
Article 29 cited above.
66) Article 87(5) of the Rome Statute envisages cooperation between the Court and a State 
non-Party only on a voluntary basis. However, some might say that such an obligation to 
cooperate with the Court may exist by virtue of other sources of international law, such as 
the United Nations Charter (under Article 25 or Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as was the 
case for Sudan in Resolution 1593 (2005) of the Security Council) or customary international 
law in respect of violations of ius cogens norms. See Faustin Z. Ntoubandi, “Towards Ending 
Impunity in Darfur: The ICC Arrest Warrant of 27 April 2007”, 1 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2009), pp. 144–151.
67) See Annalisa Ciampi, “The Obligation to Cooperate”, in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002), Vol. II, pp. 1607–1638.
68) Article 11bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, <www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/
IT032_Rev42_en.pdf>.
69) Article 93(10) of the Rome Statute. 
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information in criminal matters were also concluded between the ICC and 
the United Nations,70 the European Union,71 Interpol,72 and the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Organization.73
4.2. Exchange of Information between International Organizations 
Mechanisms allowing for the exchange of information have also been 
established between international organizations. Regarding the United 
Nations system, cooperation agreements were first concluded with regional 
organizations. Examples include the agreements made between the United 
Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,74 the Organization 
of African Unity,75 and between UNESCO and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations.76 Agreements of cooperation were also concluded between 
70) Article 5 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations, <www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA-
5AA9B6D1E96C/0/ICCASP3Res1_English.pdf>.
71) Article 7 of the Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European 
Union on Cooperation and Assistance, <www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6EB80CC1-D717-
4284-9B5C-03CA028E155B/140157/ICCPRES010106_English.pdf>.
72) Article 2 of the Co-operation Agreement between the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Police Organization – Interpol, 
<www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/agreements/ICC2005.asp>.
73) Article 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the International 




74) General Assembly Resolution 49/15, A/RES/49/15, 25 November 1994.
75) General Assembly Resolution 49/64, A/RES/49/64, 23 January 1995.
76) See the full text of the agreement, especially Article IV, which provides “ASEAN and 
UNESCO shall arrange to the fullest extent possible and so far as is practicable for the 
exchange of information and documents on matters of common interest. This will include, 
where appropriate, the exchange of information and documents relating to specific projects, 
programmes or activities with a view to better complementary action and more effective 
co-ordination between the two organizations”, <www.aseansec.org/7922.htm>.
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the United Nations and specialized agencies, such as the World Tourism 
Organization,77 and the World Intellectual Property Organization.78
Another significant example of these specific types of cooperation 
between international organizations are the agreements concluded with 
the International Criminal Police Organization (hereinafter Interpol).79 A 
great number of agreements on cooperation have been concluded between 
Interpol and other international organizations, such as the United Nations,80 
the International Atomic Energy Agency,81 and the International Maritime 
Organization.82 
As this brief exploration demonstrates, cooperation in the context of 
criminal procedures and cooperation between international organizations is 
rooted in agreements in an international context and on the basis of need. 
The cooperation is thus premised on a ‘consensual’ source and not on an 
77) Resolution of the Economic and Social Council 2003/2, 23 December 2003. Article 8 
of the Agreement provides that “[s]ubject to such arrangements as may be necessary for the 
safeguarding of confidential material, full and prompt exchange of appropriate informa-
tion and documents shall be made between the United Nations and the World Tourism 
Organization”.
78) Assistance is envisaged in Article 6(a) which provides “[s]ubject to such arrangements as 
may be necessary for the safeguarding of confidential material, full and prompt exchange of 
appropriate information and documents shall be made between the United Nations and the 
Organization”. See <www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/pdf/un_wipo_agreement.pdf>.
79) See, e.g., Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold, “The Administration of Information in Inter-
national Administrative Law – The Example of Interpol”, 9 German Law Journal (2008), 
pp. 1719–1752.
80) Assistance is foreseen at Article 3 of the Agreement, which states that “[t]he United Nations 
and Interpol shall make every effort to achieve the best use of available information related 
to the issues of common interest. To that end, and subject to necessary limitations and their 
internal regulations concerning the safeguarding of confidential or semi-confidential material 
and information, they shall arrange for the exchange of information and documents of 
common interest”: <www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/agreements/
UN1997.asp>.
81) Assistance is foreseen at Article 2, which provides “(1) The Parties shall exchange 
information on developments in their activities, which are the subject of this co-operation 
agreement, and projects that are of mutual interest with a view to promoting co-ordination 
and co-operation”: <www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/agreements/
InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency200604.asp>.
82) Agreement of Co-operation between the International Maritime Organization and the 
International Criminal Police Organization – Interpol (2005), <www.interpol.int/Public/
ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/agreements/InternationalMaritimeOrganization.pdf>.
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authoritative one, in contrast to that imposed by Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.83 An obligation to cooperate under sensitive circumstances is more 
likely to succeed if based on consensus. Furthermore, it must be noted that 
almost all of these treaties have a bilateral character. Indeed, it is self-evident 
that a consensus may be more easily reached between two actors than in the 
context of multilateral negotiations. As a result, it seems that if an obligation 
to cooperate between the UN and States must be achieved, it should take 
the form of consensual and bilateral instruments.
This proposition may be a cause for concern where the conclusion of a 
significant number of agreements is required. However, information-sharing 
channels at the international level show that the diversity of such agreements 
do not necessarily require a complex legal regime. Although the wording 
in these agreements occasionally changes, the conditions underpinning the 
exchange of information remain more or less the same from one agreement 
to another. 
5. exchange of Information at the european Level 
The European Union provides numerous examples of mechanisms assist-
ing the exchange of information between Member States and European 
institutions. Most of these exchanges take place between Member States 
and the European Commission. These forms of assistance stem from the 
various activities of the Commission, particularly those that endeavour to 
protect the European Union’s financial interests. For example, according 
to Regulation 2185/96, the Commission has the competence to carry out 
on-the-spot checks and inspections within Member States in order to 
protect the Communities against fraud and other irregularities.84 On the 
other hand, requests for information emanating from Member States in 
respect of the Commission can be made. In that case, assistance may take 
83) On the distinction between consensual and authoritative sources of cooperation, see, e.g., 
Muriel Ubeda-Saillard, La coopération des Etats avec les juridictions pénales internationales, 
Thesis, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, December 2009, pp.25–31. 
84) Council Regulation 2185/96 of 11 November 1996. See especially Article 7, which states: 
“Commission inspectors shall have access, under the same conditions as national admin-
istrative inspectors and in compliance with national legislation, to all the information and 
documentation on the operations concerned which are required for the proper conduct of 
the on-the-spot checks and inspections”.
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the form of access to reports drawn up by the Commission officials, such 
as inspectors’ reports.85 
Such ‘vertical’ assistance may also be provided by European entities 
other than the Commission.86 The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 
established in 1999, is responsible for ensuring the collection and analysis of 
information in relation to the fight against fraud.87 Member States are under 
a “duty to inform the Office”,88 and the Office may at any time forward to the 
competent authorities of the Member States concerned information obtained 
in the course of its investigations.89 Requests for information may also be 
made to Member States by the European Police Office (Europol), which is 
responsible for facilitating the exchange of information between Member 
States, as well as obtaining, collating, and analysing information and intel-
ligence on crimes that fall under its competence.90 The establishment of 
85) See, e.g., Zwartveld, European Court of Justice, Order of 13 July 1990, C-2/88, Rec. 
1990, p. I-3367. In this case, a Dutch judicial authority (the rechter-commissaris at the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank Groningen) requested the Commission to provide reports 
drawn up between 1983 and 1987 by Commission officials who carried out inspections in 
the Netherlands with regard to sea fisheries concerning the port of Lauwersoog.
86) Christine Kaddous, “La coopération administrative dans l’Union européenne”, in François 
Bellanger and Thierry Tanquerel (eds.), L’entraide administrative (Schulthess, 2005), p. 61.
87) See Article 2(b) of the Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/l_136/
l_13619990531en00200022.pdf>.
88) Article 7(2) and (3) of the Regulation 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF): “(2) The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and, in so far as national law 
allows, the Member States shall, at the request of the Office or on their own initiative, forward 
any document or information they hold which relates to a current internal investigation. 
Member States shall forward the documents and information relating to external investiga-
tions in accordance with the relevant provisions. (3) The institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies, and, in so far as national law allows, the Member States shall also send the Office 
any other document or information considered pertinent which they hold relating to the fight 
against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the Communities’ financial 
interests”, <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/l_136/l_13619990531en00010007.pdf>.
89) Article 10 of the Regulation 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF).
90) Article 3 of the Convention Based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on 
the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), <www.europol.europa.
eu/index.asp?page=legalconv#TITLE%20I>.
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a legal framework for this type of cooperation began taking place in 1992 
upon the inception of the Maastricht Treaty, and has been progressively 
strengthened. Mechanisms for the exchange of information can be found in 
three different domains, namely immigration policies, customs cooperation 
and the fight against fraud. 
Regarding visas, asylum, or immigration, Article 66 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty provided that “the European Council shall take measures to ensure 
cooperation between the relevant departments of the administrations 
of the Member States … as well as between those departments and the 
Commission”.91 This treaty has provided a basis for decisions of the European 
Council, like the decision of 13 June 2002 that adopted an action programme 
for administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum, 
and immigration (ARGO programme).92 The scope of this legal basis has 
been extended in the Lisbon Treaty under Article 74.93 This article is found 
under the General Provisions of Title V on the Area of Freedom, Security, 
and Justice, which includes not only immigration policies, but also judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters as well as police cooperation.
Article 135 of the Amsterdam Treaty also provided a legal basis for deci-
sions in respect of customs cooperation.94 This Article has been reproduced 
in extenso in Article III-152 of the Constitution for Europe, and in Article 
33 of the Lisbon Treaty. Such vertical cooperation was established through 
mechanisms of assistance between the administrative authorities of the 
91) See <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997E/htm/11997E.html#0173010078>.
92) See European Council Decision 2002/463/EC, 13 June 2002, <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:161:0011:0015:EN:PDF>. 
93) Article 74 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union: “The Council shall adopt measures to ensure administrative cooperation between 
the relevant departments of the Member States in the areas covered by this Title, as well as 
between those departments and the Commission. It shall act on a Commission proposal, 
subject to article 76, and after consulting the European Parliament”.
94) Article 135 of the EC Treaty: “Within the scope of application of this Treaty, the Council 
… shall take measures in order to strengthen customs cooperation between Member States 
and between the latter and the Commission. These measures shall not concern the application 
of national criminal law or the national administration of justice”, <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/
en/treaties/dat/11997E/htm/11997E.html#0173010078>. 
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Member States and the Commission to ensure the correct application of 
the law on customs and agricultural matters.95 
Regarding the fight against fraud, the exchange of information between 
Member States and the Commission may be based on Article 280(3) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which is reproduced mutatis mutandis at Article 325(3) 
of the Lisbon Treaty.96 This legal basis was notably used for the adoption 
of the ‘Hercule’ Programmes I (2004–2006)97 and II (2007–2013),98 which 
promoted activities in the field of the protection of the Community’s finan-
cial interests by “enhancing transnational and multidisciplinary cooperation 
between member States’ authorities, the Commission and OLAF”.99
It is pertinent to note that whereas the aforementioned instruments 
were concluded in specific areas, a provision in the Lisbon Treaty envisages 
cooperation within the Union as a mechanism potentially applicable to all 
cases regarding the implementation of Union law.100
95) See the Council Regulation 515/97 of 13 March 1997, especially Title III on relations with 
the Commission and Title V on the Customs Information System, <www.eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997R0515:EN:HTML>.
96) Article 280(3) of the Amsterdam Treaty: “Without prejudice to other provisions of this 
Treaty, the Member States shall coordinate their action aimed at protecting the financial 
interests of the Community against fraud. To this end they shall organise, together with the 
Commission, close and regular cooperation between the competent authorities”.
97) Decision 804/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2004, 
<www.ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/programmes/hercule/archives/en.pdf>.
98) Decision 878/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2007, 
<www.ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/programmes/hercule/en.pdf>.
99) Article 1(2a) of the Hercule Programme II.
100) Article 197(2) (on Title XXIV on Administrative Cooperation) of the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: “The Union may support 
the efforts of Member States to improve their administrative capacity to implement Union 
law. Such action may include facilitating the exchange of information and of civil servants 
as well as supporting training schemes. No Member State shall be obliged to avail itself of 
such support. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary measures to 
this end, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”.
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6. International Law and Domestic Analogies: The Concept of 
Administrative Assistance
The concept of administrative assistance is conceptually rooted at the 
domestic level. It is (classically) defined as “assistance given on the request 
of an authority or another government agency to the requesting authority 
… in order to enable or to facilitate the execution of (its) functions”.101 In 
short, it refers to cooperation between domestic administrative authorities. 
Originally, mutual assistance mechanisms were developed between authori-
ties within the same State. Obligations to give assistance could often be 
found at the constitutional level, especially in federal States. Article 35 of 
the Fundamental Law of Germany provides, for example, that “all federal 
and Land authorities shall render legal and administrative assistance to one 
another”.102 If there is no provision in the State’s constitution, assistance is 
rendered on the basis of laws or agreements.103 
Assistance mechanisms at the international level were, and continue to 
be, established between State authorities through specific treaties. These 
treaties can address the issue of assistance in general, both administrative and 
criminal, such as in the treaty signed on 31 May 1988 between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Austria.104 Additionally they can focus on one 
specific matter, like the treaty on administrative assistance in customs matters 
signed on 21 March 1975 between France and Senegal.105 The legal framework 
of inter-State assistance rests on a vast web of specific bilateral agreements. 
101) Edwin Loebenstein, “International Mutual Assistance in Administrative Matters”, 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, Supplementum 2 (Springer-Verlag, Wien-New 
York, 1972), p. 11.
102) Comparable provisions can be found in Article 22 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Austria, which states as well that “all authorities of the Federation, the States, and the 
Counties are bound within the framework of their legal sphere of competence to render each 
other mutual assistance”. Article 44 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 
provides that “the Confederation and the Cantons shall support each other in the fulfillment 
of their duties and shall generally cooperate with each other. They owe each other a duty of 
consideration and support. They shall provide each other with administrative assistance and 
mutual judicial assistance”. See François Bellanger, ‘L’entraide administrative en Suisse’, in 
Bellanger and Tanquerel, supra note 86, pp. 9–28.
103) Loebenstein, supra note 101, p. 12.
104) <www.untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/30/26/00059300.pdf>.
105) France and Senegal, Convention on Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters, 29 
March 1974, <www.untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/29/16/00056791.pdf>.
  431Fromageau / International Organizations Law Review 7 (2010) 405–439
There is no general treaty that provides requirements which can be applied 
to all forms of assistance, and on any matter. Treaties remain a traditional 
mechanism for formally establishing assistance between two States.
It may be possible to “transplant” domestic concepts,106 such as assistance 
in administrative matters, to the international level. In one case concerning 
Switzerland, a mechanism to exchange information with international 
organizations inspired by the existing inter-State mechanisms has been 
adopted.107 This is the Federal Law on the Application of International 
Sanctions or loi sur les embargos (LEmb), which provides in Article 7 that 
competent federal authorities may cooperate and coordinate their inquiries 
with international organisations.108 This law is not limited to collaboration 
with a sanction committee. It was also used by the Swiss Federal Council as 
the legal basis for the cooperation with the Volcker Commission.109
The advantage of this legal basis is that cooperation between Switzerland 
and an international organization can be based on this law or on a resolution 
adopted by an international organization. However, the determination of 
a legal basis for the cooperation at the domestic level obviously has the 
disadvantage of being limited to a single State. Even if a majority of States 
have a domestic legal basis for cooperation, it is likely that the conditions 
will differ from State to State. While a mass harmonisation exercise would 
be inherently problematic, it would possible, and perhaps more fruitful, 
106) Nicolas Valticos, “Pluralité des ordres juridiques internationaux et unité du droit inter-
national”, in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st 
Century (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 1996), p. 319.
107) In Switzerland, the existence of a legal basis is one of the conditions for providing 
administrative assistance when the information that will be shared is deemed a secret protected 
by law. See JAAC 48/1984 n°28, p. 170 (OFJ, 17.02.1983). 
108) Loi fédérale sur l’application de sanctions internationales (loi sur les embargos, LEmb), 22 
March 2002, <www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/9/946.231.fr.pdf>. This law provides a permanent legal 
basis but Swiss policy is to implement sanctions decided by the Security Council on a case-
by-case basis, with the adoption of specific ordinances. See, e.g., the Ordonnance instituant des 
mesures à l’encontre de personnes et entités liées à Oussama ben Laden, au groupe «Al-Qaïda» ou 
aux Taliban (RS 946.203), or more recently Ordonnance instituant des mesures à l’encontre de la 
République populaire démocratique de Corée (RS 946.231.127.6). For an overview of measures 
taken by Switzerland on that matter, see <www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00620/00622/
index.html?lang=fr>.
109) See Rapport final de la Commission d’enquête indépendante concernant le programme « 
Pétrole contre nourriture » : soutien apporté par la Suisse à l’enquête, <www.seco.admin.ch/
aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=fr&msg-id=9635>.
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to focus on extracting a number of basic principles from existing practice 
within States.
7. A Proposal for a Basic set of Conditions for the exchange of 
Information between the Un and states
The objective of this section is to describe the optimal conditions for the 
exchange of information that could be applied in the relationship between 
the UN and collaborating States. These conditions are derived from condi-
tions that are applied at the domestic, the international, and the European 
levels, and from the practice that already exists between international 
organizations and States. 
A leading criterion for the exchange of information, which is required 
both at the domestic and international level, is confidentiality (Section 7.1). 
We will examine the question of the potential application of the principles 
of speciality, proportionality (7.2), and good faith (7.3), in the relationship 
between States and international organizations. The question of reciprocity is 
more problematic. It appears that it should not be considered as a condition 
for the exchange of information (7.4).
7.1. Confidentiality
Collaboration with international organizations often concerns the transfer 
of information that is protected at the domestic level. Therefore the United 
Nations must provide States with guarantees that this information will not 
be made public. Consequently, States request confidentiality. For example, 
the Swiss Federal Law on the application of international sanctions provides 
that the international organisation is bound by the secret de fonction or by 
the devoir de discrétion équivalent, and there must be a guarantee that the 
information will not be used to facilitate economic spying.
Provisions on confidentiality are found in the guidelines of the committees 
concerned. In the ‘Investigations Guidelines’ of the Independent Inquiry 
Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (hereinafter 
IIC),110 it is stipulated that the Committee may determine that special 
measures to ensure confidentiality of sources or witnesses are required. 
110) See The Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme, 
<www.iic-offp.org/documents/Investigations%20Guidelines.pdf>.
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This may include the use of a confidential source registry and designation, 
limits to the access of information about the identities of certain persons, 
and the use of normal file protection. If there has been any unauthorized 
disclosure of information by any IIC staff member, this disclosure “will be 
reported by the Executive Director to the IIC Chairman so that prompt 
corrective action can be taken, which may include the removal of the 
IIC staff member and notification to the affected person(s)”.111 Similar 
provisions can be found in the guidelines of sanction committees. Taking 
a recent example, the Guidelines of the Committee established pursuant to 
Resolution 1737 (Sanction against the Islamic Republic of Iran)112 provides 
that “the information received by the Committee will be kept confidential 
if the provider so requests or if the Committee so decides”.113
Even if these guidelines “do not and are not intended to confer, impose 
or imply any duties, obligations or rights that are enforceable in any court 
of law or administrative proceedings”, the credibility of the committee will 
largely depend on how, in practice, it can guarantee confidentiality.114 Self-
imposing a strict obligation of confidentiality may also hamper the activity 
of such organs. This is especially true for sanction committees which, in the 
case of drawing up a list of individuals or entities, must deal with different 
claims that come from States, depending on how they cooperate. On the 
one hand, States in which the listed individuals and entities (or their assets) 
are believed to be located may request as much information as possible from 
the Committee about the individuals and entities listed, whereas on the 
other hand, it will be a matter of priority for States which have submitted 
111) Ibid.
112) See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006): Guidelines 
of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work, <www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/pdf/
revisedguidelinesfinal.pdf>.
113) The same provision can be found in the Guidelines for the Committee 1718 (RPDK), 
<www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/guidelines_20_jun_07.pdf>. In the guidelines of the 
Committee 751 (Somalia), <www.un.org/sc/committees/751/comguide.shtml>, it is provided 
that “[t]he Committee invites States to provide information relating to any violations or 
alleged violations by any party of the mandatory arms embargo established by the Security 
Council with respect to Somalia in paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992). The Committee is to 
make an initial appeal to all States to that effect, advising them to submit their information 
in communications addressed to the Chairman in writing, under assurance of confidentiality. 
The Committee may renew the appeal as occasion warrants” (emphasis added).
114) Ibid.
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the names of the listed individuals/entities to receive assurances from the 
Committee that the information they have provided is kept confidential.115
In April 2003, investigative offices of several international organizations 
agreed on the need to harmonize their practices and endorse a set of uniform 
guidelines for investigations.116 These guidelines state that investigators 
should endeavour to maintain both the confidentiality and, to the extent 
possible, the protection of witnesses. In short, confidentiality in the case 
of the exchange of information is guaranteed by a set of guidelines that are 
not binding on the UN committees. The imposition of an obligation of 
confidentiality, both on States and on international organizations, through 
a binding norm, could enhance the cooperation. Such norms could find 
a model in the provision regarding confidentiality made by the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). According to Article 8 of Regulation 1073/1999, 
the Office and its employees are bound by an obligation of confidentiality 
but are able to communicate information to persons within the institutions 
of the European Communities or in the Member States if necessary. 
7.2. Proportionality and Speciality 
The principle of speciality means that the information that will be transferred 
from States to international organizations, and vice versa, will be used 
exclusively in order to act in conformity with the object of the request.117 
If the receiving authority wants or needs to use the information for the 
purpose of investigating or deciding on other infractions or facts, or to 
communicate such information to other entities, the consent of the sending 
authority must first be obtained. The application of the principle of speciality 
to the relationship between States and international organizations could 
be a guarantee that the information transferred will not be used for other 
purposes than those mentioned in the said request. 
115) Machiki Kanetake, “Enhancing Community Accountability of the Security Council 
through Pluralistic Structure: The Case of the 1267 Committee”, 12 Max Planck United 
Nations Yearbook (2008), p. 118.
116) Conference of International Investigators, Uniform Guidelines for Investigations, as 
endorsed by the 10th Conference of International Investigators held on 10–12 June 2009 at 
the Dead Sea in Jordan, <www.un.org/Depts/oios/investigation_manual/ugi.pdf>.
117) Riccardo Sansonetti, L’entraide administrative internationale dans la surveillance des marchés 
financiers: Standards internationaux et réception en droit suisse, Etudes suisses de droit bancaire 
(Schutlhess Polygraphischer Verlag, Zürich, 1998), p. 170.
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According to the principle of proportionality, the requesting authority 
shall not go beyond, in its request for information, what is strictly neces-
sary to achieve the objects of its mission or mandate.118 The application of 
this principle would limit the requesting authority to request only those 
materials that are necessary in a given case, and prohibit it from pursuing 
other ends, such as other investigations, about which the sending authority 
is not informed. 
7.3. Good Faith
The necessity to cooperate in good faith was outlined by the International 
Court of Justice and by the Committee on Darfur, as cited above.119 At the 
European level, a similar requirement is found in Article 10 of the EC Treaty 
on the principle of loyal cooperation. However, as the addressees of this 
obligation are “member States”,120 it was not clear if such an obligation also 
applied to European institutions as well. The European Court of Justice, in 
the Zwartveld case, made clear that the relationship between Member States 
and Community institutions is governed, according to Article 10 of the EC 
Treaty, by a principle of sincere cooperation.121 According to the Court, “that 
principle not only requires the Member States to take all the measures neces-
sary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law … 
but also imposes on Member States and the Community institutions mutual 
duties of sincere cooperation”.122 Following this decision, the Lisbon Treaty 
118) This condition is derived from the principle of proportionality that operates in Com-
munity Law (Article 5 of the EC Treaty provides that “any action by the Community shall not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objects of the Treaty”). For further information, see 
Rob Widdershoven, “European Administrative Law”, in René Seerden (ed.), Administrative 
Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States (Intersentia, 2nd ed., 
2007), p. 316, and the condition of proportionality that operates in Swiss Administrative 
Law in the case of a demand for assistance by another States, see Sansonetti, supra note 117, 
p.168.
119) See supra Section 3.1.
120) Article 10 of the European Community Treaty: “Member States shall take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of 
this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. They shall abstain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty”. 
121) Zwartveld, supra note 85, p. I-3367.
122) Ibid., para. 17.
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on the European Union has provided, in addition to the aforementioned 
provisions, that “pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union 
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in 
carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties”.123
Two accepted forms of good faith may be distinguished. On a restrictive 
reading, good faith is seen as providing a “flexible basis with which to impose 
some basic obligations that enable the Organization to protect itself from 
acts that could undermine its functioning”.124 From a broader perspective, 
the obligation to cooperate in good faith is derived directly from the “fun-
damental feature which is the accomplishment without any disturbance of 
certain functions that aims to fulfil a common purpose”.125 Accordingly, good 
faith operates not only to protect the activities of international organiza-
tions, but also to enhance cooperation by ensuring that all available means 
are resorted to. The principle of good faith consequently entails not only 
a negative obligation, namely that the sending authority shall refrain from 
deliberately providing incorrect information which would jeopardize the 
fulfilment of the mission or mandate of the requesting authority, but also 
a positive obligation on the part of the sending States to cooperate by all 
available means with the requesting authority. In the context of the United 
Nations, the imposition of such an obligation to cooperate in good faith 
could undoubtedly enhance the cooperation of States and strengthen the 
investigation capacities of the organization. 
7.4. The Question of Reciprocity
The question of whether reciprocity can be viewed as a condition of the 
exchange of information is controversial. The Swiss Federal Law on the 
application of international sanctions stipulates that competent federal 
authorities can communicate information to international organizations and 
waive the condition of reciprocity, which is usually an automatic condition 
for the provision of documents to a foreign State. However, before the 
legislation was adopted, the Swiss Federal Tribunal clearly provided that 
123) Article 4(3) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union.
124) Robert Kolb, La bonne foi en droit international public: contribution à l’étude des principes 
généraux de droit (PUF, 2000), p. 509 (author’s translation).
125) Ibid. (author’s translation). 
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reciprocity is not a condition for the granting of administrative assistance 
between States.126 
If reciprocity is to be understood as a condition for the exchange of 
information, it would mean that States could have an automatic right to 
obtain information from international organizations on the sole condition 
that States have previously communicated information to them. This 
automatic right to information would create a conflict of norms with the 
international organization’s duty of confidentiality vis-à-vis the informa-
tion it has obtained from other States. The viability of this system may 
be threatened by such a requirement. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
Swiss Government has decided, in the context of the above-mentioned 
legislation, to renounce reciprocity in specific cases of cooperation with an 
international organization.
8. Conclusion 
The analysis of the relationship between domestic administrations and 
international organizations was an issue that was examined in the early days 
of the United Nations. In a study plan made by UNESCO on 11 April 1949 
and entitled ‘Domestic Administrations in their Relations with International 
Organizations’,127 a proposal was made to study this relationship and to 
“encourage States to improve their own domestic mechanisms in order to be 
able to fulfil their obligations as members of international organizations”.128
Recent events have once again brought this question to light. The main 
priority seems to be to establish clear legal bases for cooperation between 
States and the UN. The question of the formalization of the exchange of 
information between the United Nations and States can prompt several 
institutional responses. Such a legal basis should set out the conditions for 
its application. This legal basis could take different forms, like a multilateral 
treaty concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, a model bilateral 
126) Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 25 January 1999, 2A.345/1998, para. 3b. The Federal Supreme 
Court adopted a ‘pragmatic’ view stating that federal authorities may refuse in the future to 
communicate information to authorities which did not respond positively to their demands.
127) See UNESCO, Plan d’une etude de cooperation international l’administration nationale 
dans ses relations avec les organisations internationals, UNESCO/SS/SIC/3, 11 April 1949, 
<www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001578/157857fb.pdf>.
128) Ibid., para. 9 (author’s translation).
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treaty, or a set of uniform guidelines for international organizations. In the 
author’s view, and according to the practices analyzed before, it seems that 
the best way to achieve this goal is a model bilateral treaty. Indeed, it seems 
more adequate to base the exchange of information on a consensual source 
that could be concluded on the basis of the need. It should be noted that 
such initiatives have already been taken by some international organizations 
such as Interpol. A model agreement has been compiled on the basis of 
numerous studies.129
Another type of relationship that must be taken into account is the 
relationship between international organizations on the one hand, and 
private individuals and entities concerned with the sharing of information 
on the other. It seems that it is necessary to provide for mechanisms that 
allow individuals and entities – whose bank details have been transmitted for 
example – to contest or control the use of this information. In the absence of 
this kind of procedure, international organizations may be confronted with 
problematic consequences, as was recently illustrated in the case of listed 
sanctions of the 1267 Committee and the Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation case before the European Court of Justice.130
Regarding the possibility for individuals and entities to contest a decision 
of a State to transmit information about them at the domestic level, two 
cases that came before the Swiss Federal Tribunal have shown the inherent 
problems of the absence of a clear legal framework in this area.131 Two claims 
contesting the decision of the Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs 
to transmit confidential information to the Inquiry Committee into the 
Oil-for-Food Programme were rejected by the Federal Tribunal, in which 
it clearly drew a distinction between treaty-based assistance and assistance 
accorded without any conventional basis. In the case of assistance based on 
a treaty, a claim made against the domestic legal basis of application will be 
admissible. It was made clear in the judgment that 
129) Chapter II of this agreement is devoted to the “Exchange of Information”. See the full text 
of the Model Agreement at <www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/
Model.asp>.
130) Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council, 3 September 2008, 
European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P.
131) Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 1st Chamber of Public Law, 6 October 2005, 1A.157/2005 
and 1A.189/2005; Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 1st Chamber of Public Law, 10 October 
2005, 1A.173/2005 and 1A.203/2005.
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all transmission of information to foreign authorities will not be considered as an acte 
de gouvernement; in the majority of cases of assistance – in criminal or administrative 
matters – foreign relations are without a doubt involved, but decisions taken on that 
matter takes place within the framework of pre-established conventional relations, and 
has not the political character that justifies a subtraction to any judicial review.132 
The assistance given to the Inquiry Committee has been consequently 
qualified as a political decision, exempt from judicial review. Respecting 
privacy and the right of individuals to challenge their State’s decision to 
transmit information to another State or to international organizations 
constitute other fundamental issues that require further and more detailed 
consideration.
Transparency is also an issue that merits a more thorough examination 
in the context of the exchange of information between the UN and States. 
On initial consideration, confidentiality and transparency may appear 
contradictory. Indeed, if we acknowledge that the information shared must 
stay confidential, it seems nonsensical to insist that, simultaneously, the UN 
and the States be completely transparent in their actions. Contrarily, it is 
submitted that confidentiality and transparency are not contradictory but 
rather complementary. A balance might be achieved with, on the one hand, 
the effectiveness of the operation and, on the other, its legitimacy. In order 
to increase the legitimacy of their activities, international organizations have 
to establish mechanisms that enhance the transparency of their actions. It 
has become increasingly necessary to apply this principle in the relations 
between international organizations and States, but also between inter-
national organizations and individuals.133 The viability and the legitimacy 
of UN investigations will depend in large part on the efforts to make more 
transparent these practices that should no longer stay in the shadows. 
132) Ibid., para. 3.1 (6 October 2005) and para. 3.3 (10 October 2005) (author’s translation 
and emphasis).
133) See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law”, 
68:3-4 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005), pp. 37–39; Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept 
of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law”, 20:1 European Journal of International Law (2009), 
pp. 48–50.
